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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Conflict, expressed parsimoniously yet meaningfully, 
results from "competition between incompatible responses" 
(Miller, 1944). Conflict identified in this manner must 
be distinguished from a psychoanalytic definition invoking 
internal dynamic states and forces as explanatory concepts. 
In the interest of working with behaviors that are more 
readily observable and measurable, this paper will focus on 
conflict as defined in the first sense. 
Lewin (1931), in particular, was instrumental in launch-
ing a concept of conflict based on psychological field for-
ces. Field forces, which were considered to be acquired, 
were said to have valences which had a point of application, 
strength, and direction. Valences could be positive in that 
they elicited approach responses, or negative in that they 
evoked avoidant or withdrawal behavior. Further, the organ-
ism's actions with respect to Valences could be described 
as impulsive in nature, voluntary, " 'appropriate" ' or 
" 'inappropriate 1 "· 
The particular charge of a valence, however, was not 
considered to be static; in fact, Lewin (1935) also spoke 
of induced valences whose positive or negative charge is a 
function of not only environmental factors but also psycho-
logical and social factors. As he so clearly stated: 
Many objects in the environment, many modes of 
conduct, and many goals acquire a positive or a 
negative valence, ••• not directly from the needs 
of the child himself, but through another person. 
More important, however, is the effect of exam-
ple, that is, of that which the child sees char-
acterized by the behavior of adults as positive 
of negative for them (p. 98). 
Within this conceptual framework conflict, defined 
specifically as "the opposition of approximately equal 
strong field forces" (Lewin, 1931), has been divided in-
to three types. Type I conflicts are those in which the 
organism would find himself between two positive valences, 
and the decision was not considered to be too difficult. 
In Type II conflicts, the organism would be confronted by 
a goal having both a positive and negative valence. His 
behavior would be marked by vacillation and indecision. 
Type III conflicts existed when the organism was caught 
between two negative valences neither of which he desired 
to choose and both of which he would like to avoid by go-
ing out of the field. Oscillation in behavior was typical 
of Type III conflict situations. 
Hovland and Sears (1939) dubbed these conflict types 
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as approach-approach (Type I), approach-avoidance (Type II}, 
and avoidance-avoidance (Type III). They extended these 
types to include a fourth kind of conflict situation con-
sisting of two Type II conflict situations simultaneously, 
i. e., the organism is drawn to two goals each of wh.ich has 
positive and negative valences. This Type IV conflict, dou-
ble approach-avoidance, has been a notable contribution in 
that it is probably most representative of conflicts en-
countered daily. 
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Using a motor conflict board, Hovland and Sears (1939) 
tested Lewin 1 s assumptions that Type I conflicts would be 
easiest to resolve and Types II and III would be more dif-
ficult with more resolutions being classed as withdrawal 
from the field. The apparatus was designed so that four 
modes of resolution would be possible: single, double, com-
promise, and blocking (conceivably an instance of delayed 
reaction time and not considered to be a true mode of con-
flict resolution by the authors). The results confirmed 
Lewin's hypothesizing. The most common mode of conflict re-
solution for the Type I conflicts was the single response 
which occurred 57.50% of the time, for the Type II conflicts 
the double response at 46.88%, for the Type III conflicts 
the blocking response at 46.25%, and for the Type IV con-
flicts the blocking response at 72.50%. 
From Lewin's initial theorizing and Hovland and Sears' 
additions, Miller (1944, 1959) derived basic testable pos-
tulates regarding conflict behavior. His efforts generated 
a sizable amount of experimentation, the majority of which 
has been accomplished in the animal laboratory and has 
dealt with the parameters of conflict resolution, the grad-
ients of approach and avoidance, displacement, and generali-
zation. Comparatively, there has been a paucity of compara-
ble research into human conflict and conflict resolution (as 
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defined by this paper and as distinguished from decision-mak-
ing, discrimination or psychophysical studies). 
Sears and Hovland (1941) proposed that the relative 
strengths of competing responses might be a factor affect-
ing the mode of conflic4 resolution as well as the kinds of 
responses (approach-approach, etc.) that are in conflict. 
They predicted that as the strengths of competing responses 
approached equality, there would be an increased frequency 
of blocking responses. In a two-part experiment using Type 
III conflicts, strength of response was defined by (~) the 
amount of practice and (b) the intensity of punishment. Four 
groups of subjects were given differing degrees of practice 
on each of two alternatives in ratios approaching equality 
of 1:20, 5:20~ 20:20, 5:5. Three other groups of subjects 
either received shocks a~sociated with both, neither, or 
only one of the alternatives. The initial hypothesls was 
confirmed for, as the number of (~) practice trials and (b) 
shocks associated with each alternative approached equality, 
frequency of blockage increased. 
Barker (1946) presented college students witp all pos-
sible combina,tions of 18 personal characteristics and envi-
ronmental conditions. Subjects, who were divided into two 
groups, were presented with either all positive or all neg-
ative wording of the paired adjectives. The~ were then in-
structed to choose one of the two alternatives and also to 
indicate if their choice in a particular instance had been 
uncertain. For each subject, valences were assigned to ad-
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jectives on the basis of the frequency with which the par-
ticular adjectives had been selected. Thus, for example, 
the most desirable condition was the one chosen most often 
and was given the highest valence. Results indicated that 
the frequency of uncertain choices increased as the differ-
ence between the valences of the alternatives decreased. Al-
so, the frequency of uncertain choices was greater for nega-
tive than for positive alternatives. 
Drawing upon the studies cited above, Arkoff (1957) 
studied the resolution of approach-approach (AP-AP) and 
avoidance-avoidance (AV-AV) conflicts in a verbal conflict 
situation. Selecting seven descriptive adjectives, he pre-
sented to his college-age subjects 42 conflicts, half AP-AP 
and half AV-AV. Following conflict resolution, hi~ male 
and female subjects were requested to divide the cards into 
two piles of 21 cards each, with one pile representing the 
more difficult conflicts to resolve and the other being the 
easier conflicts to resolve. The results showed that the 
AV-AV conflicts required significantly more time to resolve 
than the AP-AP conflicts. AP-AP conflicts were also judged 
easier to res·olve significantly more often than the AV-AV 
conflicts. There were no significant sex differences. 
Minor, Miller, and Ditricks (1968) replicated Arkoff's 
study and also added an "undecided" alternative. They pro-
posed that the "undecided" alternative would facilitate re-
solution of AV-AV conflicts because it would allow the sub-
ject to go out of the field; however, its effects on the AP-
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AP con:f'licts would be negligible. Their findings were con-
sistent with Arkoff's results although females manifested 
significantly shorter resolution times than the males for 
both types of conflict. The effects of the "undecided" al-
ternative, while not significant, sharply decreased the 
mean resolution times of the AV-AV conflicts in comparison 
to Arkoff's data. 
Edwards and Diers (1962) gave college subjects pairs 
of items from the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) 
along with modified instructions which allowed them to omit 
those items where the choice might be too difficult. Select-
ed for study from the EPPS were 40 items generally believed 
to be socially desirable and 40 socially undesirable items. 
The rationale behind such a procedure was that items on the 
schedule high in social desirability would be comparable to 
AP-AP conflicts while the socially undesirable items would 
approximate the AV-AV conflict type. As predicted, social-
ly undesirable items (AV-AV) led to a significantly greater 
number of no-choice responses than the socially desirable 
items (AP-AP). 
Investigating the relationship between difficulty of 
conflicts and number of choice alternatives, Kiesler (1964, 
1966) had children choose between (~) 2 or (b) 4 approximate-
ly equal alternatives or (£) 4 unequal alternatives composed 
of two attractive and 2 much less attractive items. The al-
ternatives in this instance were candy bars chosen on the ba-
sis of a previous ranking of preferences. Recording reaction 
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time Kiesler found that the 2-equal alternative and ~-unequal 
alternative conditions presented greater conflict than the 
4-equal alternative condition. 
It is apparent from the foregoing studies that both the 
mode and speed of conflict resolution are functions of such 
variables as the (~) particular conflict type, (b) differen-
tial strengths of competing response predispositions, and 
(.£) number and kind of alternatives available to the indivi-
dual. It has also been stated by Lewin (1931, 1935) and more 
recently by Berlyne (1960) that a tendency to approach and/or 
avoid a certain environmental situation is an acquired behav-
ior and thus conflict is a learned antagonism. These basic 
findings have generated more in-depth studies in which in-
vestigators have sought to identify the cognitive processes 
involved in conflict resolution in terms of how an individu-
al actually goes about gathering information, comparing the 
alternatives, and reaching a decision (Festinger, 1964). 
There has been little research, however, into the problem 
of how an individual might acquire his particular manner of 
dealing with conflicts and how resistent to modification is 
hts style of conflict resolution. 
While each individual may have unique ways of coping 
with conflict and reaching a decision, there are also many 
features of his process of conflict resolution that he shares 
with others. Individuals can at times be characterized ac-
cording to their approach to conflict as, for example, logi-
cal, irrational, evaluative, impulsive, rapid, slow, vacilla-
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ting. It is conceivable that one way in which these behav-
iors are learned and modified is through the imitation of 
"significant others" in the environment. For young children, 
parents may be the dominant influence on behavior, while for 
older children and young adults, peers may serve as the major 
source of imitative behavior. 
Before the specific hypotheses are outlined, it would 
appear essential to tie-down imitation to a specific theore-
tical framework which will afford a clearer, more precise 
understanding of this term as it is used here. 
Imitation. 
With their classic experiments on matched-dependent 
behavior, Miller and Dollard (1941) marked the genesis of 
the empirical investigation of imitation. Preconditions 
for imitation necessitated that an imitator (~) operate 
under a drive, (b) be able to perceive the cues produced 
by the model, (~) have the physical capacity and opportun-
ity to respond, and (d) receive reward following the imita-
tive behavior. They maintained that the cues provided by 
the behavior of the "leader11 were probably more important 
than environmental cues since in the absence of the "lead-
er", the dependent subject would be unable to make his re-
sponse. Imitation was defi~ed not by the observer matching 
the model's activities, behavior for behavior, but by ~'the 
similarity in the goal responses of the two performers" (p.133). 
A more recent and certainly more comprehensive and pro-
mising theoretical formulation of imitation has been proposed 
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by Albert Bandura (1962, 1965a, 1965b, 1969a, 1969b), a major 
spokesman for the efficacy and economy of modeling techniques 
in the learning of new behaviors. Espousing a contiguity-me-
diational theory of observational learning, Bandura reasons 
that an observer comes under the discriminative stimuli of 
the model's behaviors. Behavioral cues provided by the mo-
del are then coded and stored by means of imaginal and ver-
bal representational systems which, in turn, serve to mediate 
recall and reproduction of particular responses. Images are 
formed by the contiguous association and subsequent integra-
tion of modeling stimuli and the perceptual responses they 
elicit in the observer. Visual information of the model's 
behavior may be translated also into a verbal code, or sym-
bols, which on later occasions serves to elicit previously 
observed behaviors of the models. Bandura quickly points 
out, however, that mere contiguity of sensory events, while 
necessary, is not a sufficient condition for acquisition of 
a model's responses. Attention to relevant modeling cues, 
accuracy of perception, previous discrimination training, 
and a variety of attention-directing variables affect the 
nature and degree of imitation. Also, the observer's abili-
ty to rehearse covertly and retain the coded systems is cru-
cial as is his behavioral capacity for motor reproduction. 
It is through modeling that learning can occur even 
though the observer has no opportunity to perform the be-
haviors he is witnessing. To Bandura, imitation may well 
be a case of "no-trial learning" because the observer (0) 
does not respond overtly along with the model (M). Simple 
observation of M's behavior, however, does not insure that 
matching responses will be reproduced at a later date. An 
O's tendency to imitate the M's behavior is often strongly 
influenced by vicarious reinforcement, or the positive or 
negative consequences of the M's behavior. According to 
Bandura, vicarious reinforcement is a performance- rather 
than learning-related variable and has been described as 
having several possible functions (Bandura, 1965b, 1969a, 
1969b; Flanders, 1968; Kanfer, 1965). (~) Information may 
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be transmitted to the 0 regarding response-contingent rein-
forcements in similar situations. Depending on their con-
sequences, different types of responses serve as discrimi-
native stimuli for subsequent reward or punishment. Con-
sequently, the O's performance of observed behaviors will 
be disinhibited or inhibited on the basis of what he per-
ceives as acceptable or unacceptable behavior. (b) Vicar-
ious reinforcement provides knowledge about the relevant 
and controlling environmental stimuli. Thus crucial en-
vironmental cues are made distinctive so that the 0·1 s imi-
tative responses can occur in the presence of them and in 
the absence of the M. (~) Vicarious reinforcement may serve 
as an incentive in that observation of reinforcement can eli-
cit anticipatory arousal thus enhancing the O's motivational 
level and augmenting imitative behavior. (d) Through obser-
vation of the M, emotional responses can be conditioned 
through repetitive contiguqus association. (e) The M's sta-
11 
tus can be differentially affected by the positive or nega-
tive consequences he receives since the O evaluate~ his so-
cial behavior in terms of the consequences delivered to the 
M. 
Modeling may have a significant contribution to make 
to social learning thpories which, having traditionally re-
lied wholly on instrumental or operant conditioning proce-
dures, are inadequate in their scope and completeness. 
Firstly, while operant techniques can control or strengthen 
previously learned responses, modeling procedures can ade-
quately account for the acquisition of novel or relatively 
novel responses. Also, compared to shaping procedures, mo-
deling facilitates and shortens the learning process, and 
it eliminates the time-consuming, costly, and sometimes ex-
tremely deleterious (even fatal) consequences of trial and 
error learning. Whole, complex response patterns can be ac-
quired rapidly while errors are kept at a minumum. No doubt, 
modeling procedures can be considered to have a catalytic 
function (Patterson, 1969) in the sense that they acceler-
ate the learning process yet remain independent of and unaf-
fected by the outcome. 
Proposal 
In view of the summarized findings on conflict resolu-
tion and the current status of modeling techniques, the pre-
sent paper will focus specifically on the influence of vi-
carious reinforcement on an observer's speed of conflict re-
solution. Decision time, e very sensitive measure of con-
Ll&JRARY 
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flict (Berlyne, 1960), has been selected as the dependent 
variable. This study can be fitted neatly into one of the 
two paradigms commonly used in modeling research (Patterson, 
1969): 
Sl 
Situation 
S2 
Behavior of 
the model 
S3 
A negative or posi-
tive consequence is 
attached to behavior 
R 
The observer 
responds 
The experiment by Arkoff (1957) has served as a point 
of departure for the current investigation which has adherred 
to the preferred pretest-posttest control groups design (Flan-
ders, 1968). Following a pretest of verbal conflict resolu-
tion, subjects were exposed to a M who was differentially 
reinforced for fast (RF) or slow (RS) conflict resolution 
or who received no reinforcement (NR) whatsoever. In the 
absence of the M each S then resolved verbal conflicts, AP-
AP, AV-AV, and double approach-avoidance {DAP-AV), and de-
cision time was recorded. Past findings have alre·ady sug-
gested that AP-AP conflicts will be easier to resolve than 
AV-AV conflicts which will be less difficult than DAP-AV 
conflicts. In addition, if vicarious reinforcement, con-
sidered here as having both an informational and a reward 
value, is effective in modifying decision times, then the 
following results would be predicted: 
Pretest: 
1. Decision times for AP-AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV conflicts 
should increase with difficulty of the conflict 
type and differ significantly from each other. 
Posttest: 
1. The RF condition should have significantly shorter 
decision times than the RS and NR conditions. 
2. The RS condition should have significantly longer 
decision times than the RF and NR conditions. 
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3. AP-AP, AV-AV, and DAP-AV decision times should dif-
fer significantly from each other since vicarious 
reinforcement should have its effects on speed of 
conflict resolution and not on the types of con-
flicts themselves. 
Pretest-posttest: 
1. There should be a significant positive correlation 
between pretest and posttest decision times. 
Chapter II 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty female college students from intro-
ductory psychology and biology classes at the University of 
Richmond, Virginia served as Ss. Some had participated in 
previous experiments and thus all were not naive. They were 
randomly assigned to one of three e:tperimental conditions of 
10 Ss each. 
Aiding E in this study was a female model, unknown to 
all Ss, who appeared to be college age. 
Apparatus. Although the actual items differed in some 
instances, the type of conflict presentation employed by Ar-
koff (1957) was utilized and extended here with the addition 
of the DAP-AV conflict type. At the top of a 3 X 5 index 
card for each conflict was typed: "Which would you rather 
be?" The alternatives (AP-AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV) were printed 
below the question on the left and right sides of the cards. 
The prototype for the wording of each kind of conflict is 
presented below along with a sample conflict pair. 
AP-AP: More honest 
than you are now. 
AV-AV: Less confident 
than you are now. 
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More confident 
than you are now. 
Less honest 
than you are ncu. 
DAP-AV: More confident 
but less honest 
than you are now. 
More honest 
but less confident 
than you are now. 
The items selected for the conflicts were based on a 
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prior ranking of 14 descriptive adjectives according to 
their desirability. Twenty-nine Ss, most of whom were fe-
male and none of whom served in the present study, were gi-
ven this task. They ranked Arkoff's seven adjectives--weal-
thy, intelligent, talented, popular, healthy, well-adjust-
ed, attractive--along with seven additional items--secure, 
patient, dependable, confident, honest, tolerant, sincere--
that were randomly dispersed throughout the list. Selec-
tion of the particular adjectives for the conflicts was 
based upon a rationale similar to that employed by Edwards 
and Diers (1962). Pairing items high in personal desira-
bility (determined by the computed median scores) was as-
sumed to produce equally difficult conflict situations as 
was the pairing of items low in personal desirability. 
Six items from the bottom half of the list (dependa-
ble, tolerant, patient, secure, talented, attractive) were 
chosen for the pretest. These adjectives were paired to 
make a total of 18 conflicts, 6 AP-AP, 6 AV-AV, 6 DAP-AV. 
Each adjective was used twice, once on either side of the 
card, for each conflict type and the order of conflict pre-
sentation was randomized for each s. 
The top six items (well-adjusted, honest, sincere, in-
telligent, healthy, confident) were used in the posttest. 
Paired in all possible combinations, the six adjectives 
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yielded 15 different conflict pairings which were then cast 
in AP-AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV form to make a total of 45 conflict 
situations. Again each adjective appeared an equal number 
of times on each side of the card and the conflicts were 
presented in a random order for each s. 
A stack of 45 blank cards, whose purpose will be dis-
cussed later, were also used as a dummy deck for the M. 
Decision times were recorded to hundredths of a se-
cond by a Hunter KlockKounter, Model 120A, Series D. This 
apparatus was so constructed that noiseless timing began 
by pressing a button and was terminated by releasing the 
button. A separate reset button afforded a rapid return 
to the zero-point. The timing device was shielded from 
the ~'s view by a screen. 
A plywood screen (Figure I) was so constructed that 
it (,!!) prevented the S from viewing the E's time record-
ings, (b) blocked the S's view of the timing apparatus 
and (~) cut-off the S's view of the signals relayed from 
the E to the M. The center portion of the screen had a 
small aperture two inches above the base and measuring 
2 X 12 inches. This small window allowed (~) the E to 
signal the M by means of a small 6-inch flashlight and 
(b) the E to observe the S pick up the conflict card and 
- - -
place it in one of the two decision piles. 
Procedure. The pretest, which was administered to 
all 30 Ss, provided a baseline, or pretreatment estimate, 
ot decision times and was introduced in the following 
34 11 
24 II 
12" 
_______ __.I 2" 
Figure I 
Screen 
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manner. l'he E was waiting at the door of the experimen-
tal room as each S arrived and remarked: "My experiment 
has just been temporarily interrupted. The girl I had as 
a S had to le ave to make an urgent telephone call •• ._ 11 E 
then spontaneously added: "Listen, since you are already 
here, would you like to go on and begin?" The S was di-
rected to her seat on one side o'f' the table and the E, tak-
ing her place on the other side, reached over the screen 
and commented, "Let me pick up her cards. 11 She then re-
moved the three stacks of cards (the dummy deck) from under-
neath the window on the S's side of the screen. The arrange-
ment of these 45 cards, 10 in the center and an approximate-
ly equal number casually stacked on either side, were to 
give the impression of a suddenly interrupted session. A 
deck of 18 conflicts was then placed beneath the window in 
front of the S and she was read the following instructions, 
only slightly modified from Arkoff's original version: 
I would like to introduce you to the kind of 
task you will be doing in a few minutes. Please 
listen to the instructions carefully since I 
can answer no questions once the experiment has 
begun. 
Each card in front of you describes a ooni'lict 
which you must resolve. When I give you the sig-
nal, "o.K. 11 , turn up the topmost card and study 
the conflict presented. If your choice is the 
alternative on the left, place the card, face down, 
on the table to the left of the pile. If your 
choice is the alternative on the right, place the 
card, face down, on the table ta the right of the 
pile. Following each conflict, wait for my sig-
nal to pick up the next card. 
Imagine the conflict really confronts you. Be 
sure your choice is the one you would really make 
if you really had to decide. 
Following the completion of the pretest, the E looked 
at the S and said: 
Before we begin the main task, I have a favor to 
ask of you. The other girl who had to leave is 
probably back now from her telephone call. She 
has just about completed all of the main task--
in fact, she has only about 10 more conflicts 
left to resolve. I was wondering if you would 
mind if she finished her turn on the main task 
before you get started on it? You can sit right 
over there and watch until we are finished. 
When making this last statement, the E pointed to a 
chair so positioned to give the S a side view of the M and 
E at work. As the S took her new seat, the E opened the 
door, looked out expectantly and remarked, "Here she isl" 
Returning to the table, the M sat down and the E replaced 
the three stacks of cards (with the 10 remaining conflicts 
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to be resolved in the center pile) and inquired of M, "You 
remember what we were doing? 11 and the M nodded. To further 
enhance the reality of the situation and the spontaneity of 
M's responding, the E said 11 0.K." when the M was to pick up 
a card and used a small 6-inch flashlight as a signal to 
the M to place the card randomly in one of the two piles. 
The light was held at such an angle to prevent the S from 
noticing any flashes of light or reflections off the black 
screen. A stopwatch was used to deliver these light signals 
on a variable interval schedule around a mean of six seconds. 
Subsequent to the M's resolution of the last conflict 
and without knowledge of the £ 1s decision times on the pre-
test, the E exposed the S to one of three treatment condi-
tions that were randomly ordered within each block or three. 
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One group of Ss observed E reinforce M for her fast respond-
ing (RF) with these words: "I notice that you have really 
solved these conflicts fast. That's very good!" The M re-
plied with a "Thank-you" and the E added, "I'll have to ask 
you not to discuss this experiment with anyone." The M im-
mediately rose without comment and exited from the room. 
Turning to the S, the E directed these words, "Now, it's your 
turn. 11 
A second group heard the E reinforce the M for slower 
responding (RS): "I notice that you have really taken your 
time to seriously consider the alternatives. That's very 
good!" Again the M voiced a "Thank-you", and the dialogue 
from here on was repeated verbatim from the above condition. 
The third, or control, group of Ss were exposed to the 
same M who received no differential reinforcement (NR) but 
only the instrutions not to discuss the experiment and the 
directive, "Now, it's your turn." 
Instructions for the posttest were essentially identi-
cal to the earlier instructions with only minor v.ariation 
in the wording which indicated to the S that she had some 
"additional" conflicts to resolve. The deck of 45 conflicts 
was then placed in front of her. 
Thus, in the present sutdy, the pretest served as the 
covariate and the posttest, a 3 X 3 factorial design with 
repeated measures on the conflict type, served as the cri-
terion. The E exposed the Ss to one of three types of vi-
carious reinforcement, RF, RS, NR, following which they had 
to resolve AP-AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV conflicts randomly distri-
buted in a pack of cards. Table I is a schematic represen-
Insert Table I About Here 
tation of the overall experimental design. 
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Table I 
Schematic Representation 
of Overall Experimental Design 
Pretest 
AP-AP 
~:::: AP-AP AV-AV DAP-AV I G1 : : I > Model 
-~ 
n=30 NR I G3 
Posttest 
AV-AV DAP-AV 
I I 
I 
. 
. • ) 
ln=lO 
ln=lO 
ln=lO 
I'\) 
I'\) 
Chapter III 
Results 
Pretest. A single factor analysis of variance for 
-----------------------------------
Insert Table II About Here 
-----------------------------------
repeated measures yielded a significant treatment effect 
(F=l0.83, p<.01). The Newman-Keuls teat for differences 
Insert Table III About Here 
-----------------------------------
among ordered means indicated that AP-AP conflicts wer~ 
resolved more rapidly than either AV-AV or DAP-AV conflicts 
(p<.01) but that the latter two conflict types did not dif-
fer significantly from each other as previously hypothesized. 
Posttest. Data from the posttest were analyzed by 
means of an analysis of covariance for repeated measures in 
order to statistically control for variability due to S re-
sponse differences. The main effects of the Vicarious Rein-
-----------------------------------
Insert Table IV About Here 
forcement (VR) factor (F=7.60, p<.01) and Conflict type (F= 
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Table II 
Analysis of Variance: Pretest Conflict Type 
Source of variation df MS F 
Between subjects 29 
Within !_.ubjects 60 
Conflict 2 4581.92 10.83* 
Residual 58 422.76 
*P<•Ol F. 99 c2,5B>=s.oo 
Table III 
Newman-Keuls Test of Differences 
Pretest 
Ordered means: 
(Conflict Type) 
Posttest 
Ordered means: 
{VR Type) 
Ordered means: 
(Conflict Type) 
AP-AP 
7.74 
RF 
6.79 
AP-AP 
6.94 
AV-AV 
10.66 
NR 
8.29 
AV-AV 
8.12 
DAP-AV 
11.72* 
RS 
9.85* 
DAP-AV 
9.87 * 
*Means not underlined by a common line differ significant-
ly at p<.01. 
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Table IV 
Analysis of Covariance 
Vicarious Reinforcement X Conflict Type 
Source of variation d:f MS F 
Between subjects 28 
A' (VR) 2 18042.88 7.60* 
Subj. w. A' 26 2375.19 
Within subjects 59 
B' (Conflict) 2 5983.12 19.73* 
AB 1 4 436.42 1.44 
BX (subj. w. A I) 53 303.21 
*P<.01 F. 99 (2,,26)=5.53 F.99(2,,53)=5.05 
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19.73, p<.01) were significant. A Newman-Keuls test (Table 
III) on the significant VR factor indicated that the RF and 
RS means differed significantly from each other at the .01 
level of significance. Neither the RF nor RS conditions, 
however, differed significantly from the NR treatment group. 
A Newman-Keuls test (Table III) on the Conflict factor re-
vealed, as expected, that AP-AP conflicts were resolved sig-
nificantly faster (p<.01) than AV-AV conflicts and that each 
of these conflict types were solved significantly faster 
(p<.01) than DAP-AV conflicts. Figure II graphically depicts 
Insert Figure II About Here 
the three VR types and the average decision times for the 
three conflict types during the posttest. The predicted or-
der or arrangement of the three kinds of vicarious reinforce-
ment is clearly evident; however, as noted above, only the 
RF and RS conditions differed significantly from each other. 
The graph also shows distinct time differences between the 
AP-AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV conflict types under each condition of 
VR. 
Pretest-posttest. A Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed on ~·s total pretest and posttest 
scores. An r=.77 was significant at p<.01. 
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12 
11 
10 
9 
RS 
8 
Average 7 NR 
Decision 
Time Per 6 
Conflict RF 
(seconds) 5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
i\P-AP AV-AV DA.P-AV 
Figure II 
Conflict Type and Vicarious Reinforcement 
L_ - ----------
Chapter IV 
Discussion 
Previous findings in similar studies (Arkoff, 1957; 
Minor, Miller and Ditricks, 1968) that AP-AP conf'licts are 
easier and therefore resolved more rapidly than AV-AV con-
flicts were confirmed again in both the pretest and the post-
test phases of the present experiment. The DAP-AV conf'lict, 
constructed in a similar verbal style and not heretofore in-
vestigated, was found to require a significantly longer post-
test decision time than either the AP-AP or AV-AV conflicts. 
On the pretest, DAP-AV conflicts did produce longer decision 
times than AP-AP and AV-AV items though the difference in the 
latter instance was not significant. 
Research into conflict resolution has primarily focused 
on (~) the alternative chosen or (b) the process of or acti-
vities involved in conflict resolution. While the former 
variable lends itself readily to direct observation and mea-
surement, the dimensions of the latter are somewhat more ob-
scure and require further clarification. Many of the varia-
bles operating during conflict resolution are cognitive in 
nature and either not subject to direct measurement or at 
least limited to some crude form of measurement; others are 
more readily observable and objective such as decision time. 
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Psychologists are still plagued with the problem of defining 
just exactly what is going on during this time of mental de-
bate and how the individual arrives at a final decision. 
Festinger (1964), cited earlier, has suggested that it is a 
period of information-gathering and evaluation, examination 
and re-interpretation of the available alternatives. These 
cognitive activities associated with conflict resolution, 
however, remain unspecified and tentative. Decision time, 
on the other hand, can give an indication of the time spent 
on these various cognitive exercises, whatever they may be, 
and at least affords a basis for comparison among individu-
als. 
In line with this reasoning, the present study has de-
monstrated, as proposed, that these mental operations, how-
ever they may be defined, can be speeded up or slowed down 
when a model is differentially reinforced for rapid and de-
liberative responding, respectively. Vicarious reinforce-
ment had a twofold function by serving as a source of both 
reward and information for the observer. Not only did the 
M recieve positive reinforcement ("That's veey goodl"), but 
she was also given social approval for a specific kind of 
conflict resolution, i. e., fast or slow. Thus it was clear-
ly demonstrated that Os' witnessing M reinforced for rapid 
responding tended to increase their speed of conflict re-
solution on the posttest and Os' having viewed the M reward-
ed for "seriously" considering the alternatives tended to 
deliberate longer over posttest items. 
It might be mentioned at this point that a follow-up 
study is clearly indicated. While the present experiment 
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has utilized positive reinforcements, no doubt, negative 
consequences are equally instrumental in the molding of an 
individual's mode and/or speed of conflict resolution. Thus, 
an observer's speed of conflict resolution may well be in-
creased when the model is criticized for slow, time-consum-
ing responding or lengthened when the model is reprimanded 
for hasty decision-making and foolish choices. In fact, it 
is often both positive and negative feedback, vicarious and 
direct, that inf.'luences an individual's style of resolving 
conflict. 
As noted earlier, there has been a paucity of research 
into the question of how an individual might acquire his 
particular manner of dealing with conflicts and how resis-
tant to modification is his style of conflict resolution. 
There are two practical generalizations that can be made 
from the present study with regard to these issues. Firs~ 
although this study has dealt with adult subjects, it is 
likely that the modes of conflict resolution that children 
adopt and retain as part of their behavioral repetoires are 
learned from parents, peers, and other meaningful individu-
als in their lives as they grow older. The second implica-
tion from the present findings is an extension of the first 
in that maladaptive means of coping with conflict are like-
ly alterable by manipulation of the consequences (i. e., re-
inforcements) of the selected style of conflict resolution. 
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(It might be noted that this explanation for the learning 
and unlearning of adaptive and maladaptive means of conflict 
resolution relies on no psychoanalytic or dynamic concepts.) 
Consider, for example, the individual whose approach 
to conflict resolution has been broadly labelled as "impul-
sive". Festinger (1964) has suggested that when one only 
briefly considers the information available and quickly 
makes a decision, or when he bases his decision on some mi-
nute, minor detail, he may be attempting to escape a diffi-
cult conflict situation. Such impulsive decision-making, 
he contends, would likely be a function of the degree of 
importance of the decision, the closeness of the alterna-
tives in terms of attractiveness, or a long, tedious pro• 
cess of gathering information. Lewin (1931) also noted 
that responding with respect to certain valences could be 
typed as impulsive. And through his keen observation (Le-
win, 1935) he recognized, as quoted earlier in this paper, 
the crucial effect that "example" has on children's learn-
ing to attach positive or negative valences to certain be-
haviors. The findings of the present investigation would 
suggest then that impulsive conflict resolution may well 
be a function of previous learning from the mere observa-
tion of a model positively reinforced for rapid responding. 
This is not to say that subjects in the RF condition were 
responding impulsively during the posttest, but they did, 
in fact, respond more rapidly than the RS group. 
Similar reasoning could also apply to individuals who, 
I L __ _ 
seriously weighing the alternatives, tend to be more deli-
berative in their decision-making. While slower conflict 
resolution does not necessarily mean that the individual is 
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being more evaluative, it is a condition necessary for more 
adequate handling of very difficult or important conflicts. 
Thus, while the RS group was not necessarily being more judg-
mental, they did take more time to resolve posttest conflicts 
than did the RF group. 
Thus, even though there are likely many indices for im-
pulsive or evaluative conflict resolution, a case can be 
made for using time spent making a choice. Bearing a close 
relationship, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the 
actual mental operations occurring during this period, time 
spent has proven again to be a very useful measure of behav-
ior. 
Chapter V 
Summary and Conclusions 
The present study has sought to investigate the ef-
fect of vicarious reinforcement on the speed with which 
an individual resolves conflicts presented in verbal AP-
AP, AV-AV, DAP-AV form. Following a pretest of 18 random-
ly ordered conflicts, thirty female subjects were exposed 
to a female model who was either reinforced for fast or 
slow responding, or who received no reinforcement whatso-
ever. It was hypothesized that the time spent resolving 
conflicts on a posttest, composed of 45 different, random-
ly arranged conflict pairings, would either increase, de-
crease, or remain unchanged. Relative to the three types 
of conflict, results agreed with the usual findings in 
which decision time lengthened with increased difficulty 
of conflict type. As predicted, vicarious reinforcement 
for fast and slow responding led to shorter and longer de-
cision times, respectively, on the posttest though neither 
of these conditions differed from the non-reinforcement 
group. The efficacy of vicarious reinforcement in modi-
fying the time spent resolving conflicts was discussed. 
Also explored was its practical utility in explaining how 
we might come to adapt certain styles of conflict resolu-
34 
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tion and how manipulable are these habits. 
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